Category: Real Estate; Sales & Exchanges Subject: Foreclosure Title: Validity of "Rescission of Foreclosure" Agreement IRC Sections: Filename: 1099.html Date Produced: 4/97 Copyright 1998, The Tax Resource Group. All rights reserved. Telephone
800-578-3498. Internet: www.taxresourcegroup.com Background Taxpayer (a partnership) owned a commercial office building located in California.
Due to financial difficulties, the taxpayer filed for bankruptcy protection
in October of 1995, and the bankruptcy case ended October 20, 1996. On October
21, 1996, the taxpayer's lender exercised its rights and forced a trustee
sale of the property (commonly referred to as a foreclosure). Under California
law, the taxpayer had no right of redemption. Shortly after the trustee sale (but still within 1996), the taxpayer
entered into an agreement with the lender. Even though the agreement is
titled "Rescission of Foreclosure" and the agreement recites that
the parties desire to rescind the foreclosure, it appears that the effect
of the agreement is merely to give the taxpayer the right to repurchase
the property. The taxpayer deposited into escrow some $250,000 in late December,
1996 for the purpose of the repurchase. The viability of the agreement with the lender was dependent upon the
taxpayer raising money from outside investors and/or finding a new lender
willing to refinance the property. The taxpayer was unsuccessful in its
efforts to bring in investors and/or new lenders. The repurchase arrangement
with the foreclosure lender ultimately fell through, and all negotiations
ceased in February, 1997. The taxpayer wishes to report the foreclosure transaction in 1997 under
the theory that the existence of a binding "Rescission of Foreclosure"
agreement sets aside the 1996 transaction. Discussion In my opinion, the taxpayer has absolutely no justification for the position
it wishes to take. It is well settled for tax purposes that a foreclosure is a sale of the
underlying property securing the debt. There is precedent for the proposition
that a sale can be rescinded for tax purposes. Revenue Ruling 80-58, 1980-1
CB 181, deals with a sale of real estate which was reconveyed to the seller
in the same tax year. The original contract of sale gave the purchaser the
right to rescind the sale if the property could not be rezoned within a
certain time period. Citing Penn v. Robertson, 115 F2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940),
the IRS held that because the parties were restored to their pre-sale positions
prior to the end of the tax year in which the sale occurred, the original
sale could be ignored for tax purposes. The IRS also held in the same ruling
that a sale rescinded after the end of the tax year in which it occurred
could not be ignored for tax purposes. It seems to me that despite the title of the agreement entered into by
the taxpayer and despite the recitation that the parties wish to rescind
the foreclosure, the effect of the agreement is to provide to the taxpayer
an option to repurchase the property. It is my view that even if the taxpayer
had been successful in reacquiring the property pursuant to the agreement,
reporting of the original transaction (the foreclosure) would be required. As I understand the facts, the lender took title to the property as of
the date of the trustee's sale. I further understand that the lender collected
rents and paid expenses relative to the property after the date of the trustee's
sale. Further, it is my understanding the when the whole arrangement with
the lender became untenable because of lack of investors and/or new financing
to take out the old lender, the foreclosure lender was not legally required
to do anything to continue its possession and enjoyment of the property.
In effect, when the deal fell apart in February of 1997, the foreclosure
lender simply let the status quo continue. It seems to me that the foreclosure lender had legal title to the property
at all times subsequent to the foreclosure. Further, the foreclosure lender
had all the benefits and burdens of ownership as well. As I understand it,
nothing in the agreement even remotely suggests that the parties were restored
(at any time) to the positions they were in prior to the original transaction. It is my very strong view, therefore, that the taxpayer's desire to defer
recognition of the foreclosure until 1997 is completely untenable
not because it is impossible as a matter of law to rescind a sale, but rather
that the taxpayer's facts do not support the premise that a rescission actually
occurred. |