Category: Deductions & Credits; Estate & Trusts:
Income Tax Subject: Interest Expense Title: Debt Used to Pay Estate Taxes IRC Sections: 163(h) Filename: 1184.html Date Produced: 10/96 Copyright 1998, The Tax Resource Group. All rights reserved. Telephone
800-578-3498. Internet: www.taxresourcegroup.com Per your request, I have prepared the following summary of my thoughts
and findings on the tax issue we discussed on June 26, 1996 and July 3,
1996. You asked me to spend a limited amount of time (2 hours) to determine
whether there may be support for a more taxpayer-favorable position with
respect to the following circumstances. Taxpayer operated a family farm. After his death, the taxpayer's estate
faced the prospect of having to sell the farm in order to pay estate taxes.
To avoid that result, the heirs of the estate borrowed money secured by
estate assets. The funds were then injected into the estate to pay the estate
taxes. The IRS is now asserting that the interest paid by the heirs is personal
interest. IRS claims that interest on loans used to pay taxes is inherently
personal. The results of my limited research on this matter are as follows. 1. I found nothing directly on point. 2. Temp. Reg. Section 1.163-9T(b)(2)(A) says that interest on debt used
to pay taxes is per se personal interest irrespective of the source of income
generating the tax liability. I assume this regulation is what the IRS is
relying on. While it is true that interest on debt used to pay taxes is generally
deemed to be personal interest, it seems to me that the inherent presumption
underlying the per se rule is that the taxes in question are the taxpayer's
own taxes. If the taxpayer borrows money to pay someone else's taxes, as
in this case, I think the general presumption is shattered, and one must
look to the relationship between the parties and all the other surrounding
facts and circumstances to determine the character of the interest.Further,
there is a conflict as to whether the per se rule of Temp. Reg. Section
1.163-9T(b)(2)(A) is a permissible reading of the statute. In D. Miller,
CA-8, 95-2 USTC ¶50,485, 65 F3d 687, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals
held the regulation to be valid. In contrast, there is J.E. Redlark, 106
TC --, No. 2, Dec. 51,104, where the Tax Court held the per se rule to be
inconsistent with Section 163(h) and its legislative history. Redlark is
appealable to the Ninth Circuit. At the very least, these cases indicate
that the courts are willing to analyze the facts and circumstances a little
more deeply than the per se rule set forth in the regulations would indicate. I would argue vigorously that the general interest tracing rules of Regulation
Section 1.163-8T provide that interest is to be characterized in accordance
with the use to which the debt proceeds are put. In this case, I would argue
that the debt proceeds were used in effect to acquire the farmland and the
interest thereon should be treated consistently with the income or loss
flowing from the farming operation. 3. The circumstances of this matter remind me a little of the case in
which a donee pays the donor's gift taxes. This strikes me as perhaps a
more common occurrence than the factual situation at hand. I wonder if there
may be some cases on point in this area in which the donee had to borrow
to pay the gift tax. I was unable to find anything given the limited scope
of my work; however, I think additional research time in this area might
be fruitful. 4. Notice 89-35, 1989-1 CB 675, deals with the issue of interest on debt
financed purchases of (or capital contributions to) so-called pass-through
entities (S corporations and partnerships). For interest tracing purposes,
such debt is viewed as if the purchaser/contributor had purchased his proportionate
share of each asset of the pass-through entity. Notice 89-35 does not address
estates; however, I would argue that an estate in this context is very similar
to a partnership. Normally, one does not purchase an interest in an estate
nor does one normally contribute capital to an estate, but I would argue
that the reasoning that led the Service to the conclusions with respect
to partnerships and S corporations lead to the same conclusions with respect
to estates. |